I will collapse a lot of stuff in the interest of time.

I cannot prove that the key government leaders of

Sudan——

It is not.

I was going to say, I cannot prove what the key government

leaders of Sudan were thinking about 8 or 9 months ago,

but I believe they made a conscious strategic decision to massively

attack the civilian populations from which the armed rebel groups,

the SLM and the JEM——

To implement this massive attack, they used not

just their own militaries, but they used this militia group called the

Janjaweed. The Janjaweed, it is important to keep in mind, are not

just some loose band of fellows on horses. They are an instrument

of the Government of Sudan.

What I would like to do is talk very briefly about the humanitarian

situation and then try to get a little bit at the issue of accountability.

First of all, the situation in Darfur overall continues

to deteriorate. Because the situation of the civilians is deteriorating

does not mean there have not been some improvements. The Government

of Sudan gradually has allowed additional access to us. It

is the case that the number of attacks against civilians have decreased.

That does not mean they have ended.

We have a packet about this thick [indicating], an incident log

in which we record attacks against civilians. We are keeping a

record of them as they are reported to us, and they continue up

through now, and some aerial attacks periodically also continue.

New displacement occurs on a daily basis, and sometimes it is

very large displacement. We had 1,500 families evicted from a single

location about 10 days ago. So the numbers of affected continue

to increase. Restrictions and obstructions by the government to the

humanitarian program continue. There has been improvement in

some areas, but those areas that have improved, have mostly seen

improvement specifically for the American participants. We have

made so much noise that we get our visas processed. But NGOs do

not have the leverage we do and other governments do not necessarily

get treated as quickly as we do now with respect to visas

and permits.

New problems, new restrictions, keep materializing. I will not

run through them all. Let me just mention a couple. The government

has indicated it will want UNICEF to submit any drugs and

pharmaceuticals that it uses in its programs to be tested in Sudanese

laboratories. We have a big problem in customs. We have, for

example, one NGO that is conducting what we call therapeutic and

supplemental feeding programs in Darfur. They have 2,400 kids.

These are what we might call ‘‘stick children.’’ These are the kids

that are in bad shape already. But this NGOs vehicles and the specialized

commodities they use to benefit these children have been

tied up in customs clearance for months and months and months,

and they run out of those specialized commodities this week.

USAID itself has had eight vehicles impounded for a long period

of months. They are necessary for us to do our work. They are tied

up in customs and we have now been provided a bill, an invoice

from the Sudan Government, because they want us to pay the fees

for having our vehicles stored there. They billed us for $4,000.

There is lots of this kind of stuff that continues to go on. I should

point out that they do not allow us to photograph very often. They

do not allow us to ask questions of a human rights nature. If a

minder is around, we cannot do that kind of thing. So there are lots

of problems that continue to hamper the relief operation.

Let me tell you about anticipated mortality real quick. In the testimony

I submitted, we include a chart. It is a chart that is done

by our epidemiologists that lays out what we think will be the trajectory

of what we call the crude mortality rate and the rate of

global acute malnutrition. These are figures that are prepared by

our professionals on the basis of prior experience in Sudan and

prior experience in the region.

The large number of people that it reflects as anticipated mortality—

this is as of April 1—gets up to the 300,000 or 350,000

range. But the way this is calculated, our guys develop a coefficient

that is applied against the total number of people at risk. The U.N.

less than 2 weeks ago more than doubled the total number of people

at risk, which means that the body count could dramatically

balloon. The U.N. expects that the number of people at risk will

rise to 2.2 million by October.

So you might wonder, as many people do who do not work in our

business, well, if you get some access and you can get some planes

over there and some people out there, why cannot most of these

lives be saved? The truth of the matter is some of them can and

that is what we are trying to do. But the way it works is something

like this in reality. I want you to try to understand how it is on

the ground there.

The people whose lives we and the others in the humanitarian

community are trying to save have been displaced. What that

means is they have basically lost everything. They have fled from

their homes. In many cases they have been displaced for 6 or 9

months. What that means, because we did not have any access to

those populations, is they have not been eating right or they have

not been doing anything normal, because aid has simply not been

able to be provided to them and they are entirely dependent on

other people to help them out.

Their crops were burned, their foodstocks were destroyed. They

did not get a planting in this year, so this emergency is going to

last for a while. Their livestock are dead or stolen. Their water

sources have been destroyed. There is no shelter for them. This is

an arid area. Their real houses are gone and basically what they

would normally do is put up grass huts, but because it is an arid

area there is not a lot of grass. So they are not really under shelter

in any way.

So their bodies have been weakening for all this period of time.

Less than 10 percent of them have access to latrines. They are

crowded together in these IDP camps and the rains have started.

Because there are no roofs, the rains wet them. Between the combination

of the overcrowding, the weakness of their bodies, the diseases

that are out there, the lack of sanitation, the latrines, and

all of that kind of stuff, this is what kills them.

So it is not as easy as getting some food there. There is a whole

complex approach that needs to be taken to save the lives of the

people. And the obstructions that the government has put in the

way of these programs guarantees that the body count rises. This

monstrous pile of liabilities cannot simply be overcome, and it

guarantees that even if we do the best job we possibly can there

will be a significant body count.

Let me turn a little bit to the issue of accountability within the

limits that I can with the responsibilities I have. First of all, I

think it is quite appropriate that we have, all of us, been using for

some long period of time the words ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ This has

been a real campaign.

But I think it is also appropriate that the administration, the

Secretary has indicated, are now looking at other possibilities. And

I cannot second-guess what they are going to come up with, but

looking at it from the ground level, as USAID does because our

people and our NGO partners, our U.N. partners, are on the

ground with the population, this is not an accident. You can ask

the question of intent and I cannot really prove intent, but have

these attacks been targeted? They certainly have. You can have

two villages right next to each other, one with an African Sudanese

population, one with an Arab Sudanese population; the one is destroyed,

the other one is functioning perfectly. That is a pattern

that we see across the board.

Is it widespread? Yes, it has gone on all over the three states of

Darfur. Is it systematic? Has it been carried out in very sort of logical

ways, where people were attacked, they were displaced, they

were herded into camps in particular areas? It seems to be very

systematic.

Was it conscious? I believe in my own heart it was a conscious

strategic decision in what I have seen out there. I think it is conscious

because it is even today a continuing strategy. There has

been a lot of noise made by us, by the United Nations, increasingly

by the media, by the Congress, and many, many others. What has

happened to the Janjaweed, the ones who have been doing most of

the pillaging against civilians? What has happened is nothing.

There has not been a single enforcement action that we are aware

of that has been taken against the perpetrators of this thing.

This has been going on for months. If the government wanted to

rein them in, there are steps it could take to rein them in. As a

matter of fact, there was a few weeks back a parade for President

Bashir, President of Sudan, in south Darfur in which the

Janjaweed marched in the parade. So actions have not been taken

against them.

Was there clear coordination between the Janjaweed and the

military of the Government of Sudan? From our point of view, from

my point of view I should say, clearly. The internally displaced persons

[IDPs] report to us regularly that before their villages were

attacked they were bombed. It shows a level of coordination between

the various displacing entities.

Is there a series of persistent actions on the part of the government

that will hype the body count? Yes. I mentioned a lot of them

already: the destruction of assets, food, water stocks, livestock. This

kind of destruction of assets is going to have a consequence in the

lives of the population.

Do they deny that there is a disaster going on in Darfur? Yes,

they do.

Have they been denying access to those who could go there to

help the civil population or to see and report on what was going

on? Yes, they do deny access. There has been very restricted access.

The obstructions of our humanitarian operations, I have mentioned

a few examples before. Do they limit photos? Do they limit

our asking questions on how people were displaced and who did it?

Yes, they do.

This large-scale rape and branding of women who have been

raped, presumably to prevent their reconciliation with their husbands,

and that kind of thing, does that continue to go on? Yes, it

does even now.

It seems to me there is also obstruction of accountability. The denial

and delaying of access by the U.N. human rights monitors I

think was part of an approach to doing that. Yes, they have agreed

to let six U.N. monitors come in to see this devastated area the size

of the State of Texas. Six does not cut it.

Have there been restrictions on press access? Yes, that is clear.

Are visitors who go there manipulated in what they see and hear?

Yes.

What I would say is in summary, and I will stop, that while saving

as many lives as possible in Darfur must remain ours and the

international community’s highest priority, the impact of the actions

of the Government of Sudan that undermined the effectiveness

of our humanitarian efforts will ultimately determine what

the body count is going to be, and we certainly would encourage

strong accountability efforts now because that can help save a lot

of lives.

I thank the Chairman and Members of this Committee for holding this hearing.

Your interest in Sudan is helpful and can have useful repercussions on the ground

in Sudan at a time when the situation there is more fragile and more complicated

than ever. Several Members of this Committee have been involved in Sudanese

issues for many years, and I can assure you that that fact is known and respected

in the region. Your veteran wisdom, fresh ideas, and steady engagement on Sudan

are welcome and appreciated by me, by my USAID colleagues, and by many Sudanese

I have met in my regular travels to the region. Thank you for the opportunity

to testify today.

It is tempting to describe this as two hearings in one: one hearing about the crisis

in western Sudan, and one hearing about the progress toward peace in southern

Sudan. Such a description would be dangerously wrong, however. The same Government

of Sudan (Go) that signed a long-awaited framework peace agreement on May

26 to end a 20-year civil war in the South that killed or uprooted more than 6 million

people is the same GoS that still pursues a campaign of deadly destruction and

relief deprivation against the people of Darfur in the West. The sense of injustice,

discrimination, and marginalization among black African Sudanese that partly contributed

to the insurgency that began in Darfur in February 2003 is not unlike the

deep sense of grievance among black African Sudanese that triggered the newest

round of war in the South 20 years ago.

An important link exists between the events in southern Sudan and Darfur, and

therefore a link exists in U.S. Government policy. The new peace agreement in

southern Sudan is an important achievement that the long-suffering peoples of the

south deserve to celebrate, and the international community welcomes it. But it is

a diminished achievement because of events in Darfur. We cannot allow the GoS

to believe that agreement on a peace framework in the South purchases international

tolerance for ethnic cleansing in the West. As testimony by the Department

of State today makes clear, the U.S. Government will not normalize relations with

Khartoum until the devastating GoS policies in Darfur cease.

USAID is committed to an aggressive humanitarian response to emergency needs

in Darfur, and we are committed to supporting the difficult process of reintegration,

rebuilding, healing and reconciliation in southern Sudan. But I must warn that our

obligation to respond to the immense human needs in Darfur could undermine the

necessary and justified surge of effort USAID needs to pursue in helping establish

adequate governance and reintegration in southern Sudan.

The situation in Darfur is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. It

is already too late to save the lives of many people who will perish in coming weeks

because emergency humanitarian assistance has not arrived in time due to GoS obstruction

of international relief programs. USAID analysis of potential mortality

rates in Darfur suggests that 300,000 or more Darfurians are likely to perish by the

end of this year if restrictions on humanitarian access persist. By comparison, an

estimated 30,000 to 100,000 died in the 1998 famine in southern Sudan’s Bahr el-

Ghazal Province that some members of this Committee will remember.

As the GoS and its *Jingaweit* proxy forces continue a campaign of ethnic cleansing

in Darfur that has forced an estimated 1.1 million people from their homes while

inflicting widespread atrocities, serious food shortages, deliberate blockages of humanitarian

aid, and destruction of shelter and medical care, it is possible to conceive

of chilling scenarios that could push the death toll far higher than even the astounding

level of 300,000. Some 2.2 million Darfurians are directly affected by the crisis.

An estimated 1 million people are displaced and in great danger inside Darfur,

while approximately 160,000 Darfurians have become refugees in neighboring Chad.

USAID as well as international and private humanitarian agencies have warned

for months about the urgent necessity of delivering large quantities of relief supplies

and expertise into Darfur before the onset of the annual rainy season in mid-June

begins to make entire areas logistically inaccessible. It is now mid-June; the precipitation

has arrived on schedule, and in a matter of weeks the rain will have rendered

some roads impassable to delivery vehicles and transformed crowded and unsanitary

displacement sites into breeding grounds for cholera, measles, dysentery, meningitis,

malaria, and other diseases that will claim huge numbers of lives. This is a

disaster in the making in part because prior to the rainy season the GoS consistently

imposes restrictions that delay deliveries of life-saving services. As discussed

later in this testimony, a few administrative restrictions have been eased in recent

weeks but have not disappeared and have in fact been augmented by new restrictions,

ensuring that timely humanitarian access to Darfur remains a serious problem.

That men, women, and children uprooted by the war and ethnic cleansing will die

in enormous numbers is no longer in doubt due to advanced stages of malnutrition

and disease that cannot be reversed in time. What remains in doubt is how high

the body count will climb, and whether or not the Sudanese government will finally

make saving lives in Darfur the priority rather than a chit for negotiation.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly pressed the GoS to stop the violence in

Darfur and allow full humanitarian access since the conflict’s impact on the civilian

population became apparent last year. The President, the State Department and

USAID have issued strong statements on the matter. The President, Secretary of

State and the National Security Advisor have all raised Darfur directly and forcefully

to President Bashir and Vice President Taha. Senator Danforth, Administrator

Natsios, then Acting Assistant Secretary Snyder, myself, and other senior U.S. Government

officials have repeatedly stressed the United States’ concern over the situation

in Darfur when meeting with senior Sudanese government officials in Khartoum

or Naivasha. Unfortunately, the GoS has chosen instead to pursue a policy of

violence and ethnic cleansing against the civilian population.

USAID staff conducted a mission to the region as early as April 2003, just two

months after the violence began. I accompanied the first humanitarian delivery able

to reach Darfur in August 2003. Administrator Natsios led a delegation to Darfur

last October, and I led yet another delegation to Darfur in February 2004. I returned

to Khartoum with a USAID colleague in March to help press for a humanitarian

cease-fire, and the U.S. Government played a significant role in the Darfur

cease-fire negotiations held in N’Djamena, Chad in early April. When the cease-fire

took effect on April 11, USAID mobilized a Disaster Assistance Response Team

(DART) that same day in anticipation of improved humanitarian access to Darfur.

The U.S. Government has already committed or pledged to commit nearly $300

million since February 2003 to fund the difficult challenge of providing emergency

humanitarian assistance in Darfur and eastern Chad.

Insurgent activity began in the Darfur region of western Sudan in early 2003 in

response to local political and economic grievances against the government in Khartoum.

The GoS has responded by unleashing a campaign of ethnic cleansing targeting

Darfur’s predominantly black African population. The local population has

not been spared by the fact that their Muslim religion is rooted in the same basic

tenets as that of the government in Khartoum. Sudanese government air and

ground forces, allied with *Jingaweit* militias, have systematically attacked hundreds

of villages—including aerial bombardments and helicopter gunships—in a vast pattern

of destruction readily familiar to anyone who has witnessed or analyzed similar

attacks perpetrated by GoS troops and *Murajaleen* militia in southern Sudan during

the past 20 years.

Various international human rights groups estimate that 15,000 to 30,000 civilians

have died in Darfur during the past 16 months. A cease-fire signed by the Sudanese

government and the two Darfurian rebel groups on April 8 reduced but

failed to eliminate the violence and did not reverse the underlying GoS policy of

depredation against the population. In North Darfur, an aerial bombardment on

May 28 reportedly killed 12 or more persons, and civilians report continued attacks

and harassment in that region. In parts of South Darfur, *Jingaweit* attacks reportedly

killed at least 56 persons in late May, and local populations report that

*Jingaweit* have continued to perpetrate rapes and assaults in the area. In West

Darfur, insecurity persists along the Sudan-Chad border and large numbers fled

new violence in late May, creating a new refugee outflow into Chad in early June.

Some villagers in West Darfur report that fear of *Jingaweit* attacks along the roads

have made them virtual prisoners in their own homes. Victims throughout Darfur

consistently have reported since the onset of violence that government troops participate

in attacks with *Jingaweit* militia and oversee militia activity.

Deliberate wholesale destruction is evident on the ground. Our surveillance of villages

spanning much but not all of Darfur has confirmed that 301 villages have

been destroyed and 76 have been damaged. We continue to collect data such as this

on a regular basis, finding more destruction each time. One international human

rights agency has reported that in West Darfur alone, *Jingaweit* attacked and

burned 14 villages in a single day. The long list of destroyed villages manages to

convey a sobering sense of the enormous scope of the violence and the crippling

long-term nature of the devastation: in one village we know about, all 1,300 structures

are destroyed; in another village, all 466 structures are destroyed; in yet another

settlement, 628 of 720 structures are destroyed; and the list goes on. In some

cases we know the names of the destroyed villages, while in some other cases the

village name is unknown to us even though the destruction left behind is evident.

In village after village, the attacks by *Jingaweit* and GoS troops have burned crops,

killed or stolen cattle, and destroyed irrigation systems, thereby devastating much

of Darfur’s economic base and potentially discouraging eventual population return

and reconstruction.

Victims of the attacks by *Jingaweit* and GoS military regularly describe massacres,

executions, and rapes committed in plain view. GoS planes have bombed villages

and attacked them with helicopters. We have received reports that some victims

were buried alive and others were mutilated after death. At one isolated location

visited by USAID staff in Darfur last month, local leaders reported that more

than 400 local women and girls have been raped by attackers in recent months;

some women reportedly were raped in front of their husbands, compounding the

shame and humiliation inflicted by the attackers. We continue to receive reports of

*Jingaweit* branding their rape victims, presumably to make the act of rape permanently

visible and discourage husbands from taking their wives back. A health survey

in parts of West Darfur in April found that 60 percent of the deaths there of

children older than age 5 were caused by wounds inflicted in the violence. These

acts raise questions about the community’s long-term ability to survive and reestablish

itself.

Many of the estimated 1 million residents of Darfur who are now internally displaced

have been denied safety even in displacement camps where they have gone

to seek refuge. Pro-government security personnel have blocked some uprooted families

from entering particular towns. Armed *Jingaweit* apparently under GoS instructions

claim to be ‘‘protecting’’ camps of displaced persons who fled Jingaweit attacks

days earlier. Camp occupants continue to suffer killings, rapes, and theft of relief

items. Displaced persons say that that they cannot venture outside their camps or

villages for fear of being assaulted by *Jingaweit.* Because many men fear death if

they leave, many families rely on women to perform journeys because women need

fear ‘‘only’’ rape, according to interviews with displaced families. Some communities

have refused to accept sorely needed humanitarian assistance because they fear that

distributions of relief items might attract *Jingaweit* atrocities. A United Nations

(UN) official recently reported that he has never encountered displaced populations

as frightened as the people he met in Darfur last month.

A troubling new development is the GoS effort to force frightened, displaced families

to return prematurely to their unsafe villages, where they are at the mercy of

the same *Jingaweit* militia that attacked them originally. We have received other

reports of families returning to their homes under duress after receiving GoS assurances

of reintegration assistance that in fact does not exist. Involuntary returns to

locations that are unsafe, utterly destroyed, and currently beyond the reach of international

aid would constitute yet another violation against the people of Darfur and

would compound the current humanitarian emergency.

The lack of humanitarian access to desperate populations in Darfur remains a

matter of highest priority to USAID, the U.S. Government broadly, and, we hope,

to others in the international community. While the GoS belatedly has eased or removed

some restrictions on relief programs in the past month, many GoS administrative

obstacles remain in place that translate directly into less aid and greater

probability of suffering and death for populations desperately in need.

The GoS promised in late May to accelerate visas for relief workers seeking to

enter Sudan and has lately fulfilled that promise for USAID personnel; some other

humanitarian agencies report, however, that their relief workers continue to endure

extended waits for visas. While the GoS says it has waived requirement that relief

workers traveling from Khartoum to Darfur must apply for travel permits, some

agencies continue to encounter travel permit delays as well as registration problems

authorizing them to establish operations in Darfur. Sudanese authorities have eased

their requirement of 72-hour advance clearance on all air passengers into Darfur

by reducing it to 48-hour advance notice, but travel on the ground within Darfur

remains subject to tight government controls.

Although the GoS has backed away from restrictions it planned to impose on aircraft

used in humanitarian flights, GoS customs delays on vehicles, radios, food,

medicines and other supplies imported by relief agencies have seriously hindered

humanitarian operations. One international humanitarian organization reported on

June 7 that it has had 31 tons of medical supplies and medicines awaiting GoS

clearance to enter the country since March 2, nine tons of emergency health kits

awaiting import clearance since May 1, and 13 vehicles needed for emergency health

programs bottled up by authorities at Port Sudan for durations ranging from weeks

to months. The relief agency in this particular case has made explicitly clear that

these delays will cost lives in Darfur by depriving the population of basic medicines

and depriving health workers of the mobility they need to assess conditions at isolated

locations. In another report, an international relief agency stated that 200

metric tons of food and medical supplies that arrived in Port Sudan in mid-April

had not been released because the GoS claims it is not an emergency shipment since

it arrived by sea rather than by air.

Sudanese officials have informed the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

that the government might insist on conducting its own time-consuming tests on imported

medicines that are urgently needed to save lives in Darfur. The GoS requires

international relief agencies to use Sudanese truckers to haul relief commodities

even though domestic trucking capacity is insufficient and domestic trucking prices

are three to four times higher than a year ago. Relief efforts have also been hampered

by GoS policies requiring international humanitarian agencies to partner with

local organizations possessing limited capacities and questionable neutrality to do

the work that needs to be done.

These GoS-imposed delays and restrictions have conspired to limit the number of

international relief agencies able to operate in Darfur and have curtailed the reach

of those agencies that are present there. Although the USAID Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART) mobilized on April 11 in response to the Darfur crisis, it

was prevented from establishing a regular presence on the ground in Darfur until

late May because of GoS policies that delayed each step of the process. Local GoS

officials have interfered with USAID’s DART information collection by restricting

the questions our team could ask displaced populations about why they fled and

who attacked them, at times banning our staff from taking pictures of relief operations,

confiscating a satellite telephone, and abruptly cutting short a visit to a displacement

camp. Last week GoS officials in Darfur implicitly threatened the security

of the USAID DART during a food distribution.

As a result of GoS policies restricting relief activities, combined with other

logistical and security constraints such as banditry, poor roads and rains, the bottom

line is that humanitarian access remains a grave problem, and a humanitarian

disaster is occurring as we speak. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios described

the Darfur situation in stark terms during a Donors Conference on June 3: ‘‘The

grave situation that has unfolded in Darfur in western Sudan in recent months is

the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. . . . Even in a best-case scenario,

under optimal conditions, we could see as many as 320,000 people die. Without optimal

conditions, the numbers will be far greater.’’

USAID released a chart last month projecting potential mortality rates in Darfur.

An updated version of the chart is attached. The projection indicates that, based on

initial health surveys and our experience with previous famines in southern Sudan

and Ethiopia, the death rate in Darfur might be in the process of increasing to four

deaths per day per 10,000 people at risk by the end of this month—a rate considered

to be four times higher than the emergency threshold. Absent adequate humanitarian

response, the mortality rate could be expected to more than double yet

again during July and climb relentlessly during the final half of the year to as high

as 20 deaths per day per every 10,000 people. Under this scenario, as many as 30

percent of the affected population could die by year’s end. Adding to our alarm is

the fact that a more recent nutrition survey conducted in part of Darfur suggests

that the mortality rate projected in the attached USAID chart might be too conservative.

A health survey at locations in West Darfur concluded in late May that nearly

5 percent of all children under age 5 had died within the past three months at the

surveyed locations—a mortality rate more than double emergency thresholds.

It is important to emphasize the awful truth that humanitarian conditions in

Darfur are almost certain to get worse before they get better. The annual rainy season

has arrived. Rains have begun to fall on hundreds of thousands of persons already

physically depleted by months of displacement, fear, food shortages, and abysmal

sanitation conditions in overcrowded displacement camps. USAID personnel on

the ground continue to report large numbers of uprooted families living in the open

air, without shelter or blankets for protection from the rain and temperature extremes.

Camp sanitation problems from rotting animal carcasses and months of

open defecation threaten to deteriorate further as the rains intensify. Internally displaced

person (IDP) sites in Darfur require more than a ten-fold increase in latrines

to meet minimum sanitation standards agreed to by relief specialists. Conditions are

ripe for the spread of fatal illnesses such as measles, cholera, diarrhea, dysentery,

meningitis, and malaria.

Even if security prevails and bureaucratic impediments imposed by the GoS suddenly

vanish, relief officials already know that 54 of 80 IDP camps will become fully

or partially inaccessible during the rainy season. We have seen clear evidence that

at least one hastily established IDP site is located in a flood plain that is almost

sure to be inundated in coming months. During the past two weeks, up to four

inches of rain fell in parts of South Darfur, and up to three inches in sections of

West Darfur. Meteorological data indicate that the rains are advancing northward

deeper into Darfur a bit ahead of schedule so far this year. The illustrated charts

attached to this testimony provide additional information about the number of days

remaining before seasonal rains begin to cut off sites in Darfur and eastern Chad.

The approximately 1 million persons estimated to be internally displaced in

Darfur are scattered among about 80 known camps as well as in homes and villages

not yet identified, according to UN humanitarian assessments. Some 420,000 displaced

persons can be found in West Darfur, nearly 300,000 in North Darfur, and

some 230,000 in South Darfur, the UN estimates. The natural mixing of displaced

populations with local residents has created difficulties for relief workers trying to

target the distribution of food and relief commodities to the most vulnerable people.

UN surveys indicate that relief programs to date, lacking necessary access to

many populations, are addressing only a small fraction of the immense need on the

ground. Approximately 90 percent of displaced Darfurians in need of shelter and latrines

have received neither, according to analysis by UN agencies. Two-thirds of

the uprooted population have no access to potable water; more than half have no

primary health care; about half of those in need are still cut off from emergency food

deliveries. Overall, according to UN relief officials, assistance—perhaps merely a

single food distribution in some cases—has reached only about half of all displaced

persons in Darfur because of security constraints and GoS obstructions. The aid that

manages to reach them does not fulfill their needs because those same obstructions

have left relief organizations understaffed and under-equipped. Some humanitarian

officials have advised placing a priority on relief distributions in West Darfur, where

rains will likely cause the earliest flooding and road closures, followed by South

Darfur and North Darfur in priority order based on normal rain patterns.

The GoS has taken no concrete steps to tap Sudan’s million-ton domestic surplus

of sorghum to feed hungry people in Darfur, unless donors purchase the surplus for

that purpose. The World Food Program (WFP) projects that Darfur will require

more than 21,000 metric tons of food aid per month this summer for 1.2 million

beneficiaries, increasing to a monthly need of 35,000 metric tons for 2.2 million people

by October. Due largely to USAID’s Office of Food for Peace and its commitment

of more than 86,000 tons of food assistance to Darfur, the WFP food pipeline is sufficient

to meet needs through September, but only if we have humanitarian access

and sufficient transport to deliver the food to those who need it. Deliveries currently

are dependent on three cargo planes, a limited fleet of trucks, and a road network

vulnerable to washouts. Humanitarian airlift capacity—currently about 7,000 metric

tons per month—will have to double in coming weeks to mount airlift and airdrop

operations capable of reaching 65 scattered locations where at-risk populations will

soon be cut off by the rains. Even a doubling of airlift capacity may be insufficient.

Protecting the increased food deliveries from theft will also be a concern.

USAID is supporting UN agencies examining the possibility of mounting a crossborder

relief operation from neighboring countries to reach Darfur’s people—an operation

that would require the formal agreement of those governments. The crossborder

options are problematic because of serious logistical, security, and local political

constraints.

USAID has deployed a 16-person DART team of relief specialists to the region to

oversee the work of USAID-funded partners, help set priorities, identify specific

projects and partners for additional funding, conduct assessments, and monitor the

delivery and distribution of relief supplies. Twelve other USAID staff are on stand-

by to join the DART in Darfur. The DART is acutely aware of the need to closely

consider the safety of beneficiaries in all our humanitarian planning, programming,

and information collection.

The DART has completed 14 commodity relief flights that have delivered nearly

100,000 blankets, relief items to ease water shortages, and enough plastic sheeting

to shelter more than 360,000 people once we are finally able to overcome GoS and

logistical constraints on its distribution. Additional DART relief flights are planned.

USAID’s Food for Peace Office has provided more than half of all international food

commitments to this emergency, while USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

has provided emergency assistance for health, nutrition, water, sanitation,

shelter and other relief commodities.

Of special note is an ambitious measles vaccination campaign currently underway

throughout Darfur with USAID support that is targeting 2.2 million residents for

vaccination by the end of June in hopes of curtailing the worst effects of an inevitable

measles outbreak during the rainy season. The stakes are high.

In eastern Chad, about 90,000 of the 160,000 refugees from Darfur are living in

eight official camps established by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) and the Chadian government. Two additional camp sites are under consideration.

UNHCR continues to transport refugees from insecure border areas to

the official camps. Several hundred new Sudanese refugees continue to flee into

Chad each week, indicating that the refugee flow has not ceased as violence continues

in Darfur.

The U.S. Government’s financial commitment to the Darfur crisis is considerable.

USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios pledged an additional $188.5 million for

Darfur at an international donors conference on June 3. This raises the U.S. Government’s

total planned contribution to nearly $300 million for Darfur and eastern

Chad since February 2003, of which about $116 million has already been committed

to specific projects or partners as of early June. The U.S. Government total includes

funds from the Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration

for Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad.

Mr. Chairman, I should conclude my discussion of Darfur by emphasizing that

providing emergency assistance in this crisis is much more than a matter of giving

financial support to projects that address identified needs—as important as that is.

Achieving security and access on the ground are absolutely essential prerequisites

that are missing up to this point for mounting an effective relief campaign, no matter

how well-funded the campaign might be. At USAID, we are vitally aware that

if thousands of lives and an entire society and way of life are to be saved in Darfur,

greater international pressure must be brought to bear upon the Government of

Sudan to halt the killing and rapes, reverse the ethnic cleansing and forced displacement,

and eliminate GoS policies that obstruct relief efforts. We should avoid

the trap of negotiating with the GoS for token, incremental concessions on the humanitarian

front that leave overarching GoS policies of devastation in Darfur unchanged

and undisturbed.

On May 26, the GoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/

A) signed a framework for a comprehensive peace agreement. It was an historic moment

greeted by jubilation and dancing in many southern Sudanese villages where

violence, death, destruction, family separation, and extreme isolation have been the

depressing norm for much of the past 20 years. The people of southern Sudan deserve

this moment of hope. Each new agreement brings the cessation of hostilities

closer to a permanent cease-fire and a normal, peaceful existence in the South.

While there were many partners in this effort, the role of the U.S. Government and

the personal activism of the President, his Special Envoy Senator Danforth, and

other senior U.S. Government officials have been critical to achieving this progress.

The framework peace agreement, however, is not the final stage and does not

mean that permanent peace is assured. Much work needs to be done. The parties

must now turn their full attention to reaching agreement on implementation modalities,

signing a final comprehensive peace agreement, followed by faithful implementation

of the entire peace process. The militaries must fully disengage. Local armed

militias must disband or reconcile with their neighbors. Significant returns of refugees

and displaced persons have already begun and will accelerate, requiring proper

international support to minimize the inevitable problems and tensions associated

with large population movements. Ambitious development programs are needed in

an area that by virtually any measurement is one of the most destitute places on

earth. And the need for effective governance and civil administration throughout

southern Sudan—an area as vast as Texas but with terribly depleted human re-

sources—is probably the supreme challenge if peace is to become permanent and a

force for improved conditions among the people of the South.

The international community and southern Sudanese themselves are looking to

the U.S. Government to play a lead role in supporting and nurturing the economic,

social, and political construction of the new South Sudan. Having provided more

than $1.7 billion of humanitarian assistance during the past 21 years to help save

Sudanese lives during a time of war, the challenge now is to sustain humanitarian

assistance where needed while investing more heavily in southern Sudan’s peace

and long-term development. The goal should be nothing less than to bring the benefits

of peace to every village and community in South Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, for many years I have come before this Committee to recite the

grim statistics about life and death in southern Sudan. There is now an opportunity

for southern Sudanese to establish a new and more positive database of peacetime

statistics: the numbers of people returning to their homes, the numbers of schools

opening, the numbers of health clinics established, the quantity of wells dug, the

tons of crops produced, and the miles of roads improved. Tens of thousands of refugees

and internally displaced persons have returned in recent months to their home

areas of southern Sudan, and returns are expected to accelerate with the signing

of the peace framework on May 26. USAID plans expanded programs to help the

government of South Sudan transform people’s lives with improvements in education,

health and water systems, economic recovery programs including food and

agricultural projects, infrastructure repairs, reintegration assistance for ex-combatants,

and other sectors vital for reintegration and recovery.

One of the primary development priorities must be road improvements. South

Sudan has virtually no paved roads except for a few kilometers of pavement in GoScontrolled

garrison towns such as Juba, and many dirt roads are impassable during

the rainy season and extremely difficult to traverse the rest of the year. The primitive

state of southern Sudan’s road network illustrates the daunting task of nurturing

basic development in an impoverished, isolated and far-flung area the size

of Texas after 21 years of war and generations of governmental neglect.

USAID has already committed $7.5 million to an emergency road program and

dike program that is attempting to open up major transportation corridors. The priorities

at this time are de-mining of main roads and making modest repairs to

render key roads passable in the rainy season. Better roads will foster economic activity

by linking the major southern towns such as Juba—sealed off by the GoS military

during the war—with the surrounding rural areas and with the economies of

neighboring Kenya and Uganda. Road improvements are an important step in

strengthening economic and social links between North and South Sudan—links

that could bolster political stability. Improvements to the road network and construction

of dikes will also facilitate the return home and reintegration of Sudan’s

estimated 5 million uprooted people and make the delivery of humanitarian and development

assistance easier and less expensive. USAID projects that the emergency

road program can result in a 70 percent reduction in the cost of freight deliveries,

and would enable more food aid to arrive by road at a cost savings of 60 percent

compared to air deliveries. Since 90 percent of all food aid provided to South Sudan

comes from the United States, this translates into a more cost-effective assistance

program. However, it is important to emphasize that landmines remain a major impediment

to opening up roads; de-mining must proceed concurrently with road repair

activities.

In addition to continued support for the emergency road and dike program,

USAID is planning a three-year, $60 million infrastructure program for South

Sudan that will, among other things, support longer-term road improvements and

maintenance as well as water and power generation. Further support is also needed

for dredging and barge traffic on the mighty Nile River that bisects southern Sudan

and connects South with North—an important artery for promoting trade and

North-South links.

While support for reintegration, development, and stability is important throughout

the South, there are three areas of the so-called transitional zone between North

and South that are particularly strategic and where the U.S. Government is particularly

committed in the aftermath of the recent peace negotiations. Discussions about

the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile Province, and Abyei in South Kordofan

Province were particularly delicate during the peace talks, and these three regions

are now particularly crucial for post-war stability. USAID was deeply involved in

negotiations over access to the Nuba Mountains in 2001 that provided an impetus

for a Nuba cease-fire and larger peace negotiations. When the framework peace

talks stalled last year over the future of Abyei, it was a U.S. Government proposal

that helped break the deadlock and move the peace process forward.

Health and agricultural programs are planned or already underway with USAID

support in all three regions. Infrastructure programs will improve roads, drill new

boreholes, and help establish schools and clinics. Necessary de-mining activities in

Southern Blue Nile need U.S. Government, as does the nascent civil administration

in the three transitional areas.

For those seeking evidence that true peace can take root in southern Sudan after

so much violence, a remarkable event occurred in the town of Akobo in Eastern

Upper Nile a week after the peace framework was signed last month. Eastern

Upper Nile has been one of the most volatile regions of southern Sudan in recent

years, and Akobo has changed hands several times during the conflict. On June 2,

pro-government forces approached Akobo and yet another battle appeared imminent

with the SPLM/A troops controlling the town. Akobo community leaders intervened

by separating the opposing forces and engaged in discussions with both sides to resolve

tensions and persuade the combatants to adhere to the new peace agreement.

Local Akobo chiefs continue to lead discussions to reconcile members of the pro-government

militia with the SPLM/A and the local community. Similarly, in the village

of Mading near Nasir in Eastern Upper Nile, community leaders after the signing

of the peace framework peacefully switched their allegiance from the GoS to SPLM,

and SPLM authorities assumed control of the town from GoS soldiers and militia

with no shooting. These are but two hopeful indications of the changing mood toward

peace and the impact that the signed agreement can have in villages where

the war has been waged.

However, I do not want to give the impression that events on the ground in southern

Sudan have been uniformly positive. Forces allied with the GoS attacked in the

area of Malakal, in Upper Nile Province’s Shilluk Kingdom, in March and April. Between

50,000 and 120,000 people have been newly displaced and many villages were

destroyed. Some 25,000 ethnic Shilluk have fled to Malakal town, and thousands

more to the Nuba Mountains, Kosti in White Nile Province, and elsewhere. Displaced

families have reported burning of villages, killings and rapes by militias,

looting, and destruction of schools and clinics. Compounds of international relief organizations

in the town of Nyilwak were burned as well, according to UN sources.

USAID remains concerned about continuing reports of localized conflict and persistent

obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian relief to Southern Blue Nile and

to the Eastern Front area near the Eritrea border. We are also acutely aware that

the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan insurgent group infamous for its brutality

and abductions of children, continues to operate from bases in southern Sudan and

must be brought under control to achieve security and stability along southern Sudan’s

border with Uganda.

Despite these obstacles, the signing of the peace protocols on May 26 means that

the work of building the capacity of the new Government of South Sudan (GOSS)

must start now. This is the most formidable task facing southern Sudan and is the

top priority for USAID now that a peace agreement is signed. The peace protocols

specify that the SPLM shall form the government in the South for a period of sixand-

a-half years, followed by a referendum on unity with or separation from the

North. The SPLM leadership has acknowledged the need to transform itself from

a rebel group into a functioning government.

The SPLM has made progress transitioning into a civil authority, but it will continue

to be a long and difficult process. The war might be over, but its repercussions

are long-lasting. The legacy of more than 2 million dead from the war, 5 million displaced,

and at least two generations without formal education has left a huge hole

in southern Sudanese society. The pool of educated southern Sudanese prepared to

assume the responsibilities of government and civil administration is numerically

extremely limited. USAID is working to connect the new South Sudan with the Sudanese

diaspora who have resettled abroad and have managed to obtain education

and skills that are desperately needed to help rebuild the South.

Many analysts have fretted over the years that after Sudan’s civil war ends, internal

divisions in the South will take center stage and spark new cycles of conflict.

The GOSS will immediately be faced with the need to establish democratic governance

at the highest levels to encourage broad-based popular support and a sense of

common cause among the South’s political and ethnic groups. Policies will have to

be developed regarding public finance and human resources, including revenue, taxation,

budgeting, accounting, anti-corruption, civil service development, political appointments

and elected officials. Design of a southern parliament will be yet another

priority. All of these challenges will require negotiation among southern Sudan’s

various political groups and competent public officials able to draft legal frameworks

based on southern consensus. For USAID this means that our support for southern

Sudan must be wrapped in persistence and patience, because an entire system is

being constructed largely from scratch.

Southern Sudan must create a constitution and move rapidly to ratify new laws.

The current civil administration in the South has done significant work to fashion

and implement 26 new laws, but these are still subject to ratification and do not

cover all the issues requiring new legislation. There will also be many issues surrounding

the implementation and codification of customary law.

In the United States, we take for granted that our judges have extensive legal

training and are sufficiently numerous to fill every seat at the bench. In contrast,

there are only 22 southern Sudanese lawyers for a judiciary system that will need

to fill more than 100 judgeships along with the need for prosecutors and defense

advocates. The demands on the justice system will likely be heavy as millions of

southern Sudanese return to their homes and, in some cases, become embroiled in

disputes over land and property. Weapons prevalent in the post-war environment

may be, for some individuals, the main method for resolving those disputes. Because

the GOSS judiciary will possess few human resources to cope with the large number

of people seeking justice after decades of grievances and neglect, USAID will support

development of a para-legal system and an interim dispute resolution system.

Trafficking and abduction of women and children is a particularly egregious practice

that has reflected the contours of the conflict in Sudan. Since 2002, abductions

have significantly diminished with the cessation of hostilities. Former abductees are

now returning home to join the families they had lost. Sudan, however, remains in

the worst tier of the State Department Trafficking in Persons report. New allegations

of trafficking and abductions are surfacing in Darfur, and much work remains

to be done to reverse the effects of abductions and trafficking suffered in the South.

USAID is deeply troubled by findings from staff interviews with numerous women

and children, originally from the South, who have been returned from the North to

the South. Many of these women and children stated that they in fact were not abducted

from the South but were nonetheless taken by force to the South because

they were southerners living in the North. USAID and our implementing partners

will continue to expose and work to prevent these corrupt practices and fund programs

that legitimately assist those who have been abducted to return to their

homes and families.

Southern Sudanese need and deserve honest government officials. Leading American

anti-corruption expert Robert Klitgaard recently completed, with USAID support,

a series of meetings and workshops on honest and transparent government for

SPLM leadership and county executives. The workshops generated a great deal of

interest in instituting systems to prevent and reduce corruption. SPLM leaders have

regularly stressed a theme of anti-corruption in their public presentations of late.

Part of a strong, democratic system is a vibrant civil society of professional associations,

unions, human rights groups, faith-based organizations, community-based

groups, and independent media. USAID will work to help grass-roots groups grow

into strong organizations with the capacity to serve their members’ interests, thereby

laying a foundation for civil society to be an active voice in governance. USAID

will support public opinion research and nonpartisan civic education on peace and

governance. A Sudan Radio Service and the Sudan Mirror newspaper with an ever-widening

circulation in the South already receive strong support from USAID. We

have long backed projects encouraging South-South dialogue and reconciliation and

are providing support for a conference later this month bringing together 350 traditional

chiefs from throughout the South to meet with SPLM leadership to review

the framework peace agreement and advance the notion of reconciliation among

southerners.

The U.S. Government is the primary donor for these types of democracy and governance

and transitional programs in the South. Many international donors may

focus on northern areas where U.S. development assistance currently is difficult to

implement because of our legislative restrictions. The U.S. Government is one of the

few donors that has taken proactive steps to fund development assistance in southern

Sudan during the past ten years. We have already begun to create a network

of trust, experience and lessons learned that other donors do not yet have in the

South.

With humanitarian needs still quite large and with many militia groups still

under arms and weighing the advantages of violence versus peace, it will be important

that southern Sudanese see and experience a visible peace dividend, particularly

in areas of particularly acute ethnic or political divisions.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it seems almost incomprehensible that so many people

in Sudan have suffered—and continue to suffer—so much. I believe that

marginalized populations throughout Sudan, including the people of Darfur, have a

vested interest in the successful implementation of the agreement to end the long

civil war between the GoS and the SPLM. The provisions of that framework agreement,

if faithfully implemented by the parties and seriously supported by the international

community, could be an important step toward engendering the fundamental

democratic transformation that is the best hope for the permanent improvements

needed and deserved by the long-suffering Sudanese people.

You are not talking humanitarian?

It depends if you want numbers that relate to

Darfur or in general. Under a normal year, because this has been

a long war in the south, we are normally providing in the area for

the last few years of $200 million a year. Those are resources that

are primarily going to the people war-affected in the south and people

who were displaced into the cities of the north.

Darfur is of course a much more recent situation.

We have actually committed since the beginning of the Darfur

thing $116 million and with pledges that would rise up to about

$300 million. But as I think Senator Biden mentioned, he was distinguishing

between what is already appropriated and what is not,

of that $300 million figure about $145 million is from current appropriations

since the end of last fiscal year and into this fiscal

year.

Well, they can turn us on or turn us off in terms

of access. But generally we do not do anything through the government

of Khartoum.

No.

Correct.

We are developing a set of very specific benchmarks

so that bureaucratic enthusiasm for the peace process will not overcome

reality on the ground. We have not come to closure yet on

what those benchmarks are, but they will be things like the actual

protection of these IDP camps by the government against the

Janjaweed, active actions against the Janjaweed if this process continues,

cessation of any reports, provided we can get the cease-fire

in place, of Antonov bombers going anywhere, cessation of use of

helicopter gunships—those kinds of things.

We are developing a set of benchmarks and these benchmarks

are going to be timed over the next month. We are not done with

it yet, but we will share that with you when we are done with it.

But that is the level of detail we are going at this with.

The rest of the world is not as engaged as we are.

The Europeans have been unusually slow. They have been unusually

parsimonious with their contributions so far. We really need

to have the collaboration of the other major donor governments.

That is one thing we need.

In my view, it is also the case that we need the Secretary General

of the U.N. personally to provide a level of leadership that is

unmistakable. You mentioned Rwanda. He has a history in Rwanda.

The Secretary General can help change this from appearing to

be a problem between the United States and Sudan, since we are

doing so much of the humanitarian thing, into the rest of the world

also being concerned, and that would change the dynamics. I think

the Government of Sudan would have to take the Arab world and

the African world into account seriously, and the one who can bring

that on line I personally think is the Secretary General.

I would say, quite candidly, I think we are very

tight. We have made significant commitments. We are continuing

to shift around our resources within our international disaster assistance

account. We are looking at everything we can to make

sure we continue to be liquid. But Darfur at this level was unexpected

and so there is some tightness in our situation right now.

Do I wish that we were more liquid? Absolutely.

He would provide a level of legitimacy that would

be very helpful right now. Given the battle that took place with respect

to the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the fact that we

were basically alone in asserting a firmer posture with respect to

human rights in Sudan, the fact that we are so high profile when

it comes to trying to respond to the situation in Darfur and everything,

makes it sort of in a way take on a character that really it

does not deserve.

I mean, first of all, the population that is dying right now is a

Muslim population. Where is the Muslim world fussing about this?

It is an African population. Where is Africa broadly?

I think what I am trying to suggest is Kofi Annan said the right

things a few months ago. I think he could bring a legitimacy that

would help depoliticize the way many people look at this kind of

a situation right now, and that is what we need right now. We

need the whole world to pull together.